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ABSTRACT
The fact that various myths influence the shape of law and the mythologization of some of its 
aspects is indisputable. In most cases, this process of “mythologization” is perceived pejoratively, 
leading to the establishment of groundless, irrational ideas and at the same time the rejection of “sci-
ence” in favor of “fiction”. This article aims to propose a different approach to both the concept of 
myth and the mythologization of law, by referring to the classical, ancient understanding of the concept 
of mythos as a fable, story. Ancient Greek myth performed a function similar to the law, establishing 
some basic rules in society. Stressing its “narrative” side indicates that what matters is not so much 
a description of reality, but a process that emphasizes the relational nature of the community. Thus, 
relating the myth, just like reading the norm of law, is an interpretation of the event in the light of 
applicable principles and systems of values, while being also a continuous process of shaping social 
awareness. Interpreting the law as a story means that those who create and use it lose the luxury of 
simply remaining the “mouth that pronounces the words of the law” as Montesquieu stated, since 
they are supposed to care not only for its implementation, but also for the quality and conviction of 
citizens as to its validity. The proposed form of reading the law as a myth-fable, political myth there-
fore is a search for a plot, understood as a possibility to act, to respond to the needs and problems of 
the changing world as well as the development of “the political” politics and education of citizens.
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The statement that the law has its source in myths only appears to be a trivial 
one. For somehow it seems that unification of “mythology” with a broader concept 
of “culture” and “tradition” is automatically carried out, and these factors undeni- 
ably influence the shape and manner of legislation. Mythology and the myth itself, 
however, deserve a more individual treatment, not only as a component of a broader 
issue of culture, but also as a key concept enabling the constitution of the principles 
of that culture and the basic norms of social life. The use of the term “myth” in 
the context of law is often associated with the analysis of the “mythologization” 
of it, i.e. the assumption that certain concepts, such as the principles of the rule of 
law, its rationality, validity, or certain due (or not) behaviors are given the rank of 
general values, superior, always binding, often contrary to empirical observations 
or the current practice.1
Moreover, the ostensible “rationalization” of the discourse and the positivist 
approach not only do not limit the mythical thinking about law, but themselves 
become a new legal myth – how else may we define the belief that social, political 
and even economic problems can be solved by introducing a specific regulation, 
and that the new norm will automatically change social attitudes? This issue was 
clearly presented by Peter Fitzpatrick, who stated that the law itself is a form of 
a myth: it is intended to incorporate the ideal but is only its imperfect reflection, 
a mode of present existence. We sometimes ascribe a quasi-religious value to norms 
and their application, but they are only mundane and temporary.2
The aim of this study is to propose a new approach to the analysis of law, by 
perceiving law as a myth, but in its ancient Greek sense – as a fable, thus a certain 
activity within a community, not only as a theoretical set of more or less actual 
principles. So far, this way of interpreting the law has not appeared too frequently 
in the literature. The developing trend of “law & literature” is based rather on the 
deconstruction of myths (and fables), and therefore directed “backwards”. On the 
contrary, the “mythologization” of law in the sense proposed in this text, suggesting 
a “fabular”3 perception of law, aims to draw attention to other elements linking law 
and myth, above all the constant possibility of re- and interpretation, i.e. reacting to 
the changing situation and updating conveyed content, which is also related to the 
continuous process of educating the recipients. Thus, interpretation understood in 
this way requires constant re-reading of the content, not just recreating specific rules.
1 K. Koźmiński, Mity państwa prawa. W co wierzą prawnicy, politycy i obywatele?, „Pressje” 
2017, no. 50, pp. 83–92.
2 P. Fitzpartick, The Mythology of Modern Law, London – New York 2002, p. X.
3 The choice of this word is elaborated later on, however it is worth explaining here, that it is 
dictated by a certain ambiguity contained in a possibly more linguistically correct word “fictional”.
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The above remarks lead to the necessity of at least a general explanation of the 
meaning of the term “myth” and its previous understanding in matters related to 
law, which at the same time is meant to enable a new way of interpreting the issue 
of “mythologization of law” and law as a myth.
WHAT IS A MYTH? DEFINITION PROBLEMS
The concept of myth is experiencing a kind of renaissance nowadays and it 
appears more and more often in scientific research, however, it should be noted 
that it is understood in many different ways. In fact, it is impossible to create one 
universal definition of a myth; moreover, the strive for specialization has led to 
the creation of various “subtypes” of it, each with its own definitions.4 Thus, we 
can talk about anthropological, psychological, sociological, historical, ethnological 
myths or in the field of literary theory or religious studies, etc.
Still one of the most popular interpretations of the term “myth” is the one made 
by Mircea Eliade,5 who considered the myth to be a ritual tale of origins, telling 
a sacred story, and therefore the intrusion of the sacrum into the profanum sphere, 
that is, the real world. An important element for Eliade is repetition and ritualiza-
tion, as he recognizes the need to recreate the myth in an unchanged form so that it 
still retains its relevance. This interpretation, similarly to others from the fields of 
anthropological and religious studies, just to mention, for example, the concept of 
Bronisław Malinowski, causes certain problems. First of all, it is adapted to prim-
itive communities. A significant part of researchers dealing with the issue of myth 
and its relationship with the law, use as examples the traditional practices of native 
tribes,6 i.e. those that still cultivate old traditions and original forms of worship.
It is difficult to recognize the correctness of this interpretation in relation to the 
most important collection of myths in European culture, that is Greek mythology, 
because it contains many different fables, depicting diverse, sometimes contradicto-
ry versions of events, and besides, it presents not only the tales of creation but also 
4 Some of these are mentioned by, e.g., A. Sepkowski (Człowiek w przestrzeni mitycznej, [in:] 
Mity historyczno-polityczne, wyobrażenia zbiorowe, polityka historyczna. Studia i materiały, eds. 
E. Ponczek, A. Sepkowski, vol. 1, Toruń 2010, pp. 13–29). See also R. Barthes, Mit i znak. Eseje, 
Warszawa 1970.
5 M. Eliade, Aspekty mitu, Warszawa 2006.
6 Jean-François Lyotard writes about the ritual tales of the Kaszinahua tribe, Magdalena Kry-
sińska-Kałużna analyzes Native Americans’ culture, Mircea Eliade himself devotes relatively little 
space to complex Greek myths, Émile Durkheim concentrates on totemism, Łukasz Trzciński mainly 
cites examples of Buddhist, Eastern, Kabbalah and again Native Americans. See J.-F. Lyotard, Post-
modernizm dla dzieci, Warszawa 1998, p. 46; M. Krysińska-Kałużna, Prawo jako mit, Kraków 2017; 
É. Durkheim, Elementarne formy życia religijnego. System totemiczny w Australii, Warszawa 2010; 
Ł. Trzciński, Mit bohaterski w perspektywie antropologii filozoficznej i kulturowej, Kraków 2006.





numerous plots intertwining with historical time.7 It is impossible to find the most 
original version of Greek mythology – the one known to us today is a collection of 
accounts from various eras, subject to constant supplements and modernization,8 
although it has a certain “skeleton” or a solid “core”. However, this “skeleton” is 
not the oldest variant of the story, meaning the only correct narrative, but rather 
it consists of the values, principles of conduct and individual dilemmas that refer 
to social problems. Mythology, while being at the same time a message about the 
past, contains postulates for changes to be introduced in the present, and therefore 
sets the direction of development,9 both for individuals and entire communities.
Moreover, the Greek myth has never been based on direct repetition, but rather 
on interpretation and reinterpretation, which can be evidenced most clearly by Greek 
tragedies, presenting well-known motifs, but transforming them depending on the 
expectations of the audience, current needs or intentions of the authors. Repeat-
ability was only a formal condition, resulting from the technical requirements of 
song-making and the preservation of the metre, as was in the songs of the aoidoi, 
or from similar patterns of a thinking process, inevitable within one culture. Thus, 
in order for individual tales included in Greek mythology to be considered a pure, 
primal “myth”, many of their essential elements would have to be reduced in order 
to reach only the universal, repetitive “core”, which would, paradoxically, (if, as 
I indicated earlier, that would be possible at all) to strip them of their universality. 
The constant interest in Greek mythology, however, comes not from its simplicity, 
but precisely from its multivariant character, literary representation and integrity 
with European culture and society, manifested above all in the various distribu-
tion of accents depending on the needs and issues raised, while, at the same time, 
maintaining a certain universal message and desired values such as justice, peace, 
the rule of law, etc.
When looking for a different, more modern, definition of the term “myth”, we 
can refer to the dictionary definition. In the Dictionary of the Polish Language, 
“myth” is defined as:
1) a story about the life of gods, demons, legendary heroes, trying to explain 
the creation of the world and the rise of human being,
7 Włodzimierz Lengauer distinguishes between sacred myths about gods and historical myths 
about heroes, whereby in my opinion this division may raise considerable doubts, since heroic myths 
also contain sacred elements, for example those resulting from the hero’s origin. There is no doubt, 
however, that myths were used to explain historical phenomena, or were interpreted as an allegory 
of them, which is done, e.g., by Herodotus. See W. Lengauer, Religijność starożytnych Greków, 
Warszawa 2004, p. 17; Herodot, Dzieje, Warszawa 2007, I, 1–4.
8 H. Samsonowicz, O „historii prawdziwej”. Mity, legendy i podania jako źródło historyczne, 
Warszawa 1997, p. 17.
9 Ibidem, p. 24.
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2) a false opinion about someone or something; fiction, fairy tale, fantasy, 
daydream,
3) a false story about a person or event.10
The term, as it were, contains a certain falsehood in it. Its former meaning is 
not only narrowed but also distorted. The ancient myth, since it dealt with the most 
antique events in the history of the world and humanity, connecting them with the 
sacrum, could never be false.11 Nowadays, the myth is identified with a “fairy tale”, 
a story for children, or a populist, simplified message for those who do not want to 
investigate the facts themselves. As Joanna Włodarczyk writes, “the myth calms 
down, explains and presents simple solutions, so needed in the era of globalization 
and informational noise. It offers ready-made recipes and frees you from thinking”.12
The definition of a political myth, presented in the PWN encyclopaedia, is 
similarly constructed. According to it, the political myth is part of a broader con-
cept of social myth, meaning certain, and what is important, irrational unjustified 
ideas about social reality, often constituting systems of stereotypes and rational-
izing antagonisms.13 Also, in this case, the emphasis is on irrationality, as well as 
antagonisms and stereotypes, i.e. a simplified, “childish” approach, in the common 
understanding – untrue.
One of the first and best known definitions of political myth was created by 
Georges Sorel, for whom the myth was an idea “reflecting and synthesizing peo-
ple’s aspirations, being at the same time a stimulating and directing action”,14 and 
thus not only an idea, but also a program, and, as he clarifies, “the myths are not 
description of things, but expressions of the determination to act”.15 Intuitively, 
a fairly large discrepancy can be seen here, because Sorel’s myth is an action, not 
a fable. The effect of irrational human action is opposed with rational projects and 
institutionalized discussions, so Sorel somehow divides the ancient understanding 
of myth into two aspects: (1) utopia, i.e. a rational plan, an intellectual narrative, 
and (2) myth, the action per se, beyond the reach of discussion. However, this 
division seems to me to be purely theoretical and artificial, since it is impossible 
in practice to separate Sorel’s utopia and myth, which in the political sphere must 
10 Mit, [in:] Słownik języka polskiego, https://sjp.pl/mit [access: 10.02.2021].
11 M. Eliade, op. cit., pp. 10–14.
12 J. Włodarczyk, Współczesne mity polityczne. Mity okrągłego stołu oraz IV Rzeczypospolitej 
jako mity powstania nowego państwa, „Poliarchia” 2013, no. 1, s. 142.
13 Wielka encyklopedia powszechna PWN, vol. 7, Warszawa 1966, p. 366. More on the issue 
of political myth, see M. Jaskólski, Mit polityczny, [in:] Słownik doktryn politycznych i prawnych, 
eds. K. Chojnicka, M. Jaskólski, vol. 4, Warszawa 2009, pp. 193–201; T. Biernat, Mit polityczny, 
Warszawa 1989 (here are also other definitions of political myth, which I do not quote due to their 
exhaustive description in the literature and the fact that the purpose of this article is to propose a dif-
ferent interpretation).
14 M. Jaskólski, op. cit., p. 195.
15 G. Sorel, Rozważania o przemocy, Warszawa 2014, p. 39.





essentially occur simultaneously – behind most of the insurgencies there is a plan 
or an idea.16 Moreover, while Sorel’s description of the myth as an irrational action 
may indeed seem adequate when we consider political myth in a historical context, 
it is completely detached from other interpretations, especially on literary, theolog-
ical or anthropological grounds.
A definition closer to today’s understanding is proposed by Ernst Cassirer, who 
recognizes that the contemporary myth is created artificially, constituting the final 
instance of appeal when simple rationalization is no longer possible. According to 
Cassirer, it must combine two paradoxes – it is rational and magical at the same 
time: developed for specific reasons and used for certain purposes by its creators, it 
is based on irrational beliefs and faith of the audience. Thus, the myth has become 
instrumentation of politicians and activists, produced by specialists like any other 
object.17 Moreover, it is worth noting at this point that the isolation of a purely 
political myth is also entirely theoretical: each myth is in some way political, and 
most political myths are simultaneously historical, sociological, and even literary. 
It is difficult, however, to consider a rich collection of Greek, Roman, Celtic, Ger-
manic and many other stories as spontaneous plans of action, and at the same time 
they cannot be denied their political nature – after all, they concerned social issues, 
standards of conduct and issues related to the exercise of power and organization 
of the states. Thus, an attempt to divide and “classify” individual myths as myths 
of a specific type leads to the narrowing of the understanding of this term and the 
limitation of research possibilities to one specific field and thus stripping the myth 
from its universal aspects.
FICTIONAL ASPECT OF MYTH AND LAW
How, then, can, or in my opinion, the concept of myth be understood, not only 
in general but primarily in the context of law? Using the word “fictional” might be 
a bit misleading, since it suggests something untrue. However, by it, I understand the 
aspects of fable and plot in both myths and law, something that is better described 
by the Polish word fabularny. I would advocate referring to the ancient Greek 
understanding of myth, where mythos18 usually meant a certain story, a fable. In 
16 G. Sorel (ibidem, pp. 124, 29–40) himself points out that “there are few myths which are 
perfectly free from any Utopian element”, and that “it is identical with the beliefs of a certain group, 
it is an expression of these beliefs in the language of movements”, thus emphasizing the “active” 
function of the myth, but at the same time blurring the division, because “beliefs”, like utopias, can 
also be the product of intellectual work, but implemented in a practical, not purely theoretical, form.
17 E. Cassirer, The Myth of the State, New Haven – London 1946, pp. 281–282.
18 At first, in Greek thought, there was no distinction between mythos and logos. These terms 
were first clearly contrasted by Pindar, and then consistently put in opposition from the time of Plato. 
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Aristotle, it is a plot (as Hneryk Podbielski expresses it in the translation of Poetics), 
having different variants, and just as tragedy interprets and reflects certain aspects 
of the myth, the myth itself presents the history of the world, gods and heroes, at 
the same time being their allegorical interpretation.19 It is impossible to ignore the 
relationship between the law and these mythical stories – the law has its sources in 
mythology, consisting not only in a simple dependence, that it derives from basic 
values which are inscribed in myths, such as the already mentioned rule of law, 
the need for justice, obedience, rules regarding the exercise of power. Moreover, in 
the myths themselves specific laws are described and established – many mythical 
events represent precisely the constitution of political norms and rules.
What is more, the plot is not a simple account of reality, but also implies ex-
plaining the causes and potential effects of the actions (or omissions)20 taken by 
the actors. Therefore, it combines answers to the questions of “Why?” and “Where 
from?”.21 The myth is not limited to a synthetic presentation of the situation, but 
most often presents a whole sequence of events leading to it, as well as their results, 
additionally introducing interaction with the sphere of sacrum,22 which gives the 
plot an additional significance while encouraging the form of personal, inner ex-
perience and imitation, enabling cognition and personal development. Mimesis is 
a condition of catharsis, not only in art but also in social life. The fable is therefore 
not a description but a process, emphasizing the relational nature of a community in 
which dialogue and conversation are necessary, instead of a simple presentation of 
views or their imposition by one of the parties.23 The very original idea of the myth, 
being an oral story repeated by singers, assumed listening, which could later enable 
the reconstruction of the story, with the listener becoming a potential co-creator. 
The ritualization so emphasized by Eliade in Greek myths is only, as I signaled 
earlier, a formal repetition, assuming a similar pattern of thinking and a potential 
course of action that is meant to lead to the desired goal. Telling a myth, just like 
See I. Trzcińska, Logos, mit i ratio. Wybrane koncepcje racjonalności od XV do XVII wieku, Kraków 
2011, p. 41; K. Narecki, Logos we wczesnej myśli greckiej, Lublin 1999, p. 38; W. Lengauer, op. cit., 
p. 20.
19 W. Lengauer, op. cit., p. 16.
20 J. Hillman, Uzdrawiające fikcje, Warszawa 2016, p. 21.
21 Chiara Bottici presents a slightly different thesis, maintaining that the main question to 
which the myth answers is “Where from?”, and its primary goal is not to explain but to establish the 
principles. It seems to me, however, that these two questions are not mutually exclusive but rather 
complementary, and the answer to the question “Why?” additionally can serve to perpetuate the rules 
and values by the myth introduced, as it is easier to accept the existence of certain rules when they 
are explained. See C. Bottici, Imaginal Politics: Images Beyond Imagination and the Imaginary, New 
York 2014, p. 129.
22 J. Hillman, op. cit., p. 25.
23 Most often – the state. More broadly, see I. Barwicka-Tylek, Słuchanie. Zapomniany fundament 
demokracji, „Ethos” 2019, no. 1, pp. 125–151.





reading a legal norm, is therefore to interpret an event in the light of the applicable 
rules and value systems, and this is not only a temporary activity, performed at the 
time of the problem (violation of rules) but a continuous process of shaping social 
awareness, developing the desired patterns, in short – education.
The Greek classical myth combined many kinds of myth today: it was both 
historical and political or social. At the same time, it tried to present “the past”, that 
is, old events, ways of thinking, history of the community, combined with “now”, 
highlighted in the changing views, new values, and desired social attitudes. In the 
modern myth, there is often a transfer between the past and present, as it justifies 
that today it is still the way it used to be, and it used to be because certain events 
took place: the wider context does not matter. Meanwhile, the Greek myth aimed 
not only to transfer but also to indicate the causes and consolidate the rules and 
constitution of the social order.24 The cosmogonic myth explains not only the origin 
of the world and religion, but also the validity of social rules, which result from 
the fact that after a period of struggles and unrest, Zeus gave the world Dike, or 
justice, which is vividly represented by Hesiod in his poems. Athens are supposed 
to uphold the rule of law because it was on their Agora that the Erinyes have been 
tamed and new procedural rules have been introduced. Theseus is the one who 
urges the Greeks to unite for the first time and then recognizes the need to hand 
over his power to citizens who understand the whole city’s needs better than he 
does. Thus, a myth simultaneously establishes and strengthens the desired course 
of action. He suggests the Athenians should respect it so it may remain a symbol 
for all of Greece, thus a specific action, while explaining why the rulers of Athens 
(as well as the Athenians themselves) aspire to be “better”, while not identifying 
every Athenian ruler with the mythical righteous Theseus, allowing changes and 
reinterpretations to appear. The hero is a signpost showing the desired direction of 
development, but it does not mean that everyone will achieve the same effect, be-
cause the hero is someone extraordinary.25 His attitude, however, his person makes 
other, “ordinary” people have a model to which they can aspire. For example, the 
above-mentioned myth about Theseus depicts the birth of a leader who then creates 
the foundations of the new system in a peaceful manner and places power in the 
hands of the citizens themselves, giving up the privileges of the monarch. The story 
of Telemachus allows us to illustrate the desired features of the ruler and to indicate 
various ways of organizing the state and the implications arising from them, while 
at the same time shows young men the need to develop, break out of the family 
nest and enter adulthood. The tragedy of Orestes leads to the creation of new rules 
24 S. Hrebenda, Mitologia społeczna w literaturze fantastycznonaukowej, Katowice 2000, p. 9; 
W. Werner, Kult początków. Historyczne zmagania z czasem, religią i genezą. Szkice z historii histo-
riografii polskiej i obcej, Poznań 2004, p. 10.
25 Ł. Trzciński, op. cit., p. 15.
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of punishment and the replacement of revenge with an independent, fair trial. Even 
Heracles, as Włodzimierz Lengauer points out, introduces a certain order with his 
actions, establishing (albeit often with force) the law – he demands the promised 
payment, cares about respecting the will of the gods, punishes the villains.26 The 
hero is a model, he embodies the problems and paradoxes of everyday life, his ac-
tion, regardless of individual consequences, primarily bring positive effects for the 
entire community,27 and at the same time confirms the validity of existing ethical 
rules or leads to their changing. By “filtering” experiences and presenting them in 
a form that is simpler for the recipient, the myth presents the complexities of life, 
indicates the course of action and encourages imitation.
The law is trying to achieve exactly the same effect.28 The law made by heroes 
is linked to their heroic activity, just like them, it becomes a story inscribed in 
tradition. Thus, it can achieve absolute power in society – not as established and 
sometimes imposed regulations, so not in a strictly positivist sense, but as a compo-
nent of social consciousness, because the law, like the myth, explains and sanctions 
a certain order within the community. Its presence presupposes the existence of 
a community in which it itself performs the functions of an ancient hero, setting 
standards, describing the desired behaviour and obligations of citizens, protecting 
and sometimes making difficult decisions. The role of those who preach this tale, 
like the aojds, poets and tragedians in ancient Greece, is extremely important in this.
If the law is a fable, then those who create and apply it – legislators, lawyers, 
judges – lose the luxury of simply announcing or applying its norms, i.e. remain-
ing Montesquieu’s “mouth that pronounces the words of the law”, because a good 
fable requires commitment from the narrator, taking into account the conditions 
of the world presented, the character of the heroes, potential plot twists and mor-
als, and additionally – grasping the interests of the listener or reader. Hence, the 
lawyer or a judge is not only to take care of the enforcement of the law but is also 
even obliged to care for its quality and convince citizens of its rightness. In fact, 
similar assumptions were made by Leon Petrażycki, who claimed that the activity 
of lawyers should be to transfer the norms to the consciousness so that they may 
work intuitively. An analogous approach was also presented by the first Spartan 
legislator Lycurgus, a figure otherwise mythologized in later centuries, who forbade 
anyone to write down his laws, but instructed citizens to implement strict rules of 
upbringing, which should embed the binding rules in the Lacedaemonians’ con-
sciousness so deeply that they would obey them automatically, without the need 
to refer to written regulations.
26 W. Lengauer, op. cit., p. 177.
27 Ł. Trzciński, op. cit., pp. 154–156.
28 J.S. Bruner, O poznawaniu. Szkice na lewą rękę, Warszawa 1971, p. 55.





The “mythologization” of law makes it impossible to fall into nihilism and an-
archy, when positive law is a result of the interests of various groups that constitute 
it, and thus arouses deep opposition among others who consider the non-compliance 
to be desirable and even downright commendable. Because a myth is not only 
a fable itself, but the form of acting ON the fable,29 hence the law thus understood 
is inscribed in society, its values, needs, traditions and history, and at the same 
time does not remain obsolete, because, like every story, it remains susceptible to 
interpretations that allow it to react to the current problems, and cannot be reduced 
only to a set of documents. Moreover, such understood mythologization is not only 
about creating exemplary models of actions that can only be recreated or imitated, 
like it has been suggested by Eliade,30 but also about the possibility of acting or 
creating and modifying – not all mythical values remain constantly valid, but even 
that itself is justified in the myth, since gods and heroes also changed the social 
order, represented different attitudes, and sometimes overthrew the previous orders. 
Therefore, mythologization does not encourage us to go back to the origins, but, 
on the contrary, teaches us to think, interpret and how to maintain pluralism. Like 
in any fable – the plot is progressive.
CONCLUSION
Belief in myth did not prevent the ancients from a rational approach to reality.31 
On the contrary, mythological narratives contained a part of ancient knowledge – 
the function of myth was not only to name or explain things and phenomena but 
also, as already mentioned, to ground them in reality. Hence, it did not only concern 
simple physical phenomena, such as the creation of the world, the development of 
nature or the history of gods and people, but also more abstract values: the issues of 
governance, justice, law. The ancient myth creates a cultural base that also contains 
the desired values, patterns of proper behaviour and social attitudes, enabling the 
formation of political life, not only at the beginning of civilization but also “here 
and now”.
Greek myths can form the basis for considerations about the state and law. They 
can be analyzed, broken down into prime factors, reinterpreted and some univer-
sal conclusions can be drawn from them, which enable not only efficient but also 
fair management of the state and society. The discovery of the role and meaning 
of myth in this process may be just as important, if not more important, than the 
29 C. Bottici, op. cit., p. 129.
30 Wiktor Werner (op. cit., p. 12) argues otherwise, stressing that the myth should be passed on 
unchanged because it constitutes a kind of a model.
31 Z. Dudek, Psychologia mitów greckich, Warszawa 2013, p. 15.
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efforts to adapt their content to contemporary problems. It is not necessary to add 
modern nomenclature and abandon the traditional message to make it relevant 
and appeal to people today. There is no need to add new threads, supplement their 
content with contemporary assumptions or ascribe today’s motivations or values 
to the heroes, but it is enough to feel the fable to see its multidimensionality and 
timeliness. Searching for a second bottom by distorting the message of myths and 
assigning them the content not contained in, which, however, constitute significant 
contemporary problems, not only does not facilitate the search for a solution but 
also diverts attention from the originally announced values. The traditional message 
also makes sense, and besides, it also possesses an emotional, social and historical 
load, because it points to important problems of old societies, most of which have 
not become obsolete at all. Updating can only make the reader lazier, unwilling to 
look for solutions personally, but focusing on individual, specific problems given 
to him in such a way.32
The proposed approach is thus also different from the trend of “law & litera-
ture”, which is gaining popularity in Poland because it is not intended to simply 
deconstruct myths (or literary texts in which they are contained) in order to find 
the basic values of the aforementioned “core” or search for elements of the law in 
them. This method of analysis, due to the limited collection of myths, is doomed 
either to an increasingly frequent appearance of the already established content or to 
overinterpretation and a strenuous search for “contemporary” threads. Meanwhile, 
reading the law as a fable, and therefore a process, consists not only in finding the 
message contained in literature or regulations but also in searching for a plot, i.e. 
the possibility of action enabling, even nowadays, the development of judicial ac-
tivism or deepening our political nature. According to Szymon Hrebenda, a myth 
is “a specific type of story in which a certain existential situation is brought into 
reality, serving to mediate between the contradictions of the real world. At the same 
time, thanks to the presentation of easily digestible information about the world, 
this story organizes the life of the community that identifies with it”.33 The author 
used this definition to prove that science fiction, also a certain genre of a story, is 
a myth. At the same time, on the basis of it, one can quite adequately consider that 
it could apply to a myth understood as a law, which, however, also aims to “mediate 
between the contradictions of the world” and “organize social life”. Over the past 
decades, science fiction has tried to keep up with the dynamically changing reality, 
32 The above allegations refer largely to the otherwise brilliantly written and witty book entitled 
On Law and Myths, which de facto deals with the problems of today’s world (or rather the Republic 
of Poland), and treats myths not so much as a starting point, but completely modify their content. In 
my opinion, this is an interesting literary procedure, but destructive for the very message contained in 
the myth, since it completely diverts any attention from it. See E. Łętowska, K. Pawłowski, O prawie 
i o mitach, Warszawa 2013.
33 S. Hrebenda, op. cit., p. 75.





adjust its vision of the future and take into account the changes taking place in the 
world. An analogous fate may, therefore, be shared by law, understood as a fable 
about our reality and responding to the needs and problems of the changing world.
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ABSTRAKT
Fakt wpływu rozmaitych mitów na kształt prawa oraz mitologizacja pewnych jego założeń są nie-
podważalne. W większości wypadków ten proces „mitologizacji” postrzegany jest pejoratywnie – jako 
prowadzący do ugruntowania bezpodstawnych, irracjonalnych wyobrażeń i zarazem do odrzucenia 
„nauki” na rzecz „fikcji”. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest zaproponowanie odmiennego podejścia 
zarówno do samego pojęcia mitu, jak i do mitologizacji prawa poprzez odwołanie się do klasycz-
nego, antycznego rozumienia pojęcia mythos jako fabuły, opowieści. Starogrecki mit pełnił funkcję 
zbliżoną do prawa, ustanawiał bowiem pewne podstawowe reguły obowiązujące w społeczeństwie. 
Zaakcentowanie jego strony „fabularnej” wskazuje zaś, że istotny jest nie tyle opis rzeczywistości, 
ile proces podkreślający relacyjny charakter wspólnoty. Tym samym opowiadanie mitu, podobnie 
jak odczytywanie normy prawa, stanowi interpretację zdarzenia w świetle obowiązujących zasad 
i systemów wartości, jest również ciągłym procesem kształtowania społecznej świadomości. Ujęcie 
prawa jako opowieści powoduje, że ci, którzy je tworzą i stosują, tracą luksus prostego pozostania 
monteskiuszowskimi „ustami ustawy”, ponieważ mają się troszczyć nie tylko o jego wykonywanie, 
lecz także o jakość oraz przekonanie obywateli co do jego słuszności. Proponowana forma odczytania 
prawa jako mitu-opowieści, mitu politycznego polega zatem na poszukiwaniu fabuły, czyli możli-
wości działania umożliwiającego reagowanie na potrzeby i problemy zmieniającego się świata oraz 
na rozwój polityczności i edukację obywateli.
Słowa kluczowe: prawo; mit; fabuła; mit polityczny; mitologizacja; interpretacja prawa
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